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WHY EN BANC CONSIDERATION IS NECESSARY
The panel decision conflicts with the express language of a federal
rule of civil procedure and prior decisions of this Court regarding the preservation
requirements for jury instruction errors. The panel decision also conflicts with
existing decisions of the Supreme Court and this Court regarding the kinds of
statements that are actionable in defamation under the First Amendment.
Consideration en banc is necessary to secure and maintain the uniformity of the
Court's decisions on these questions of exceptional importance.
In applying de novo review to an unpreserved instructional error, the
panel decision eviscerates Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 51and creates a new,
sweepingly broad "awareness" exception that swallows the rule and renders it
meaningless. According to the panel, parties who do not comply with Rule 51 are
not limited to "plain error" review—even though that is what Rule 51expressly
provides since its 2003 amendment. Nor are they required to satisfy the three
criteria for what was historically this Circuit's "sole" common law exception to
Rule 51. Rather, the panel adopts an expansive new exception that is shockingly
broad, unfair to trial judges and litigants, and opens the floodgates for unpreserved
instructional errors. It not only changes the outcome of this case, but substantially
lowers the bar for preservation of instructional errors in this Circuit.
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2
The panel decision also improperly extends First Amendment
protection to a type of speech that is not constitutionally protected under the
Supreme Court's decision in Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1 (1990).
The panel decision, which holds public accusations of criminal conduct to be
constitutionally protected "opinion," conflicts with Milkovich and this Court's own
post-Milkovich decisions.
FACTS
This is a defamation action. Defendant Crystal Cox made numerous
false statements about Kevin Padrick and Obsidian ("Plaintiffs") in online blogs,
accusing them of criminal conduct in their business, then offered to remove them
for, in the district court's words, the "small but tasteful sum" of $2,500 per month.
The following facts are relevant to the issues presented for en banc consideration.
Padrick is a principal and owner of Obsidian, which provides advisory
services to businesses, including businesses in distress. In December 2008,
Obsidian was retained to provide services to the bankruptcy estate of an Oregon
company called "Summit." (2-SER-94-98.) Padrick eventually became Summit's
Chapter 11 trustee and, later, trustee of its liquidating trust. (Pls. Trial Ex. 30.) At
all times, Padrick sought to recover the maximum amount possible for Summit's
creditors, virtually all of whom were defrauded Summit clients because it turned
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out the Summit principals had been running a Ponzi scheme and misappropriating
client funds. (2-SER-68-70.) Padrick has recouped over 85% of the stolen money
to date, an extraordinary result in a Chapter 11 case. (Id.) The Summit principals
have been convicted of fraud. (2-SER-70.)
In 2010, Cox, a self-proclaimed "investigative blogger," with whom
Plaintiffs had no prior relationship or contact, began posting false statements about
Plaintiffs on various websites, including ethicscomplaint.com and
bankruptcycorruption.com. (2-SER-155-187.) In her posts, Cox repeatedly calls
Plaintiffs "criminals" who have committed "fraud," "tax fraud," "corruption,"
"deceit on the government," "money laundering," "defamation," "harassment," and
other crimes, mostly related to Summit. (Id.) She asserts that Plaintiffs have
bribed politicians and media (2-SER-161) and that "many" people have told her
Padrick "is not above killing someone to shut them up" (2-SER-170).
Plaintiffs sent a cease-and-desist letter in December 2010, demanding
Cox stop making false statements about them. (2-SER-119.) Cox immediately
posted online that she would continue "exposing" Plaintiffs' crimes in her posts "in
great detail and daily []...FOREVER." (2-SER-171.) On December 25, 2010, Cox
again posted false statements on bankruptcycorruption.com ("the 12/25/10 post"),
accusing Plaintiffs of tax fraud and other crimes. (2-SER-115.) Per Cox, this post
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has gone "viral," is "everywhere," and, due to Cox's Internet skills, appears as a top
search result—along with her other derogatory posts—whenever someone searches
online for Padrick or Obsidian. (2-SER-103-110.)
Plaintiffs sued Cox for defamation. Almost immediately, Cox offered
her "services" to Plaintiffs. (2-SER-123.) For $2,500 a month, Cox would take
down her own posts, "protect" Obsidian's online reputation from people like her,
and "promote" its business. (Id.) Plaintiffs rejected Cox's extortion attempt.
It is undisputed that Cox's derogatory statements about Plaintiffs are
all completely false and that she made no effort to verify them. (E.g., 2-SER-8789.) Nonetheless, the district court allowed only one post to go to the jury—the
12/25/10 post, which appeared on a website that looked more legitimate to the
court. (1-SER-33-35.) The court ruled on summary judgment that all of Cox's
other false statements were constitutionally protected "opinion." (1-SER-49.) It
noted that anything posted on an online blog is "inherently" unlikely to be
actionable. (1-SER-9.)
The parties were ordered to submit instruction requests and trial
memoranda a week before trial. (Docket 39.) Cox did not request any
instructions. In her memorandum, Cox argued that the "actual malice" standard of
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) applied because Plaintiffs
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5
were "public figures." (Docket 81 at 4-6.) Separately, she argued two Oregon
statutory defenses based on her being "media." (Id. at 1-4.) The district court
rejected Cox's "public figure" argument, holding that Plaintiffs were not public
figures. (1-ER-39-43.) It construed Cox's "media" argument to implicate Gertz v.
Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974), in which the Supreme Court adopted a
negligence standard for media defendants in defamation actions, and explained
why it was rejecting Cox's argument that she was "media." (1-ER-7; 1-ER-43.)
The case proceeded to trial. At the close of evidence, the court
proposed instructions, including an instruction that knowledge and intent are not
elements of defamation under Oregon law. (2-ER-181.) The court asked if the
parties had any objections, and Cox said twice she did not. (2-SER-111-114). The
court then gave the instructions. Recognizing the great damage Cox has caused to
Plaintiffs' reputations, the jury awarded $2.5 million to Plaintiffs. (2-SER-56.)
After verdict, Cox obtained counsel, who moved for a new trial based
on instructional error. Counsel made a host of new constitutional arguments,
including that the "negligence" standard should be extended to non-media
defendants like Cox. Delighted, Cox told the press: "I recommend that everyone
go pro se and lawyer up for the appeal, this way you get to introduce more
elements into the case." (Docket 115 Ex. 1.)
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Until the new trial motion, the district court had never considered
whether the "negligence" standard should be extended to non-media defendants.
The only argument Cox had made was, "I am media." (1-ER-13 (new trial
decision).) Her new trial motion raised "an entirely different argument"—that
there is "no special First Amendment protection for 'media' defendants." (1-ER14.) Applying Rule 51(d)(2), the court refused to revisit its instructions except for
"plain error." (1-ER-5-7.) It noted that there was a common law exception to Rule
51 but that Cox did not meet its requirements. (Id.) Finding the law unsettled
regarding extension of Gertz to non-media defendants, the court found no plain
error in its instruction and denied a new trial. (1-ER-14-24.)
PRESERVATION REQUIREMENTS FOR
INSTRUCTIONAL ERRORS IN THIS CIRCUIT
The panel's de novo review of an unpreserved instructional error is
contrary to the express language of Rule 51, as amended in 2003. Moreover, the
panel has taken what used to be a narrow historic common law exception to Rule
51, gutted its three requirements, and thereby created a hopelessly broad new
exception that is impossible to apply in practice and will result in countless
improper appeals and new trials. If the Court intends to keep the historic common
law exception, notwithstanding the 2003 amendments to Rule 51, it is critical that
the Court squarely address what is required to qualify for that exception and avoid
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Rule 51. Otherwise, a flood of improperly preserved instructional errors will be
submitted to the Court for de novo review.
I.

Everyone Agrees That Cox Did Not Comply With Rule 51
When a case goes to trial, the jury instructions are the moment when

the rubber meets the road. When the trial court informs the parties of its proposed
instructions and asks for any objections, parties must decide what arguments to
preserve for appeal. It is also the final opportunity for parties to make new
arguments that might affect the instructions.
Rule 51 is very clear about the requirements to preserve instructional
error. Rule 51(a)-(c) provides the procedures for parties to request instructions, for
the court to propose instructions, and for parties to object to the proposed
instructions, including "how" and "when" to object. If a party "properly objected"
to "an instruction actually given," Rule 51(d)(1)(A) allows that party to "assign
error" to the instruction. Otherwise, Rule 51(d)(2) limits review to "plain error."
Here, Cox assigns error to an instruction actually given.1 It is
undisputed that Cox did not comply with Rule 51, as the panel recognizes and Cox
concedes. (Cox Op Brief 31.) Thus, under the plain text of current Rule 51, Cox is
limited to "plain error" review. Nonetheless, the panel applied de novo review,
1

Cox did not request any instructions so Rule 51(d)(1)(B), which addresses errors
in failing to give an instruction that was "properly requested," is irrelevant.
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8
citing an historic common law exception to Rule 51. (Panel Op. 7-8.)
Given that Rule 51 now expressly provides for "plain error" review of
any instructional errors not preserved in accordance with Rule 51, the court should
consider en banc whether the historic common law exception survives the 2003
amendments. See, e.g., United States v. Kilbride, 584 F.3d 1240 (9th Cir. 2009)
("In the absence of a timely objection to the jury instructions, we review for plain
error.") (citation omitted). If it does, the en banc court should conclusively address
the scope of that exception. Otherwise, the panel has adopted an exception so
sweeping that it renders Rule 51 meaningless in this Circuit, in contravention of
prior case law recognizing a "sole," very "limited" exception.
II.

The "Sole" Historic Common Law Exception
Before the 2003 amendments to Rule 51—which added "plain error"

review for errors not preserved in accordance with Rule 51—this Circuit did not
allow plain error review, making it "the strictest enforcer of Rule 51." Voohries–
Larson v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 241 F.3d 707, 713 (9th Cir. 2001). The Court
recognized a "sole" exception to Rule 51, sometimes called the "pointless
formality" or "futility" exception, which applied only if three requirements were
met:
(1) throughout the trial the party argued the disputed matter
with the court;

Case: 12-35238

02/07/2014

ID: 8971539

DktEntry: 53-1

Page: 13 of 25 (13 of 44)

9
(2) it is clear from the record that the court knew the party's
grounds for disagreement with the instruction; and
(3) the party offered an alternative instruction.
Medtronic, Inc. v. White, 526 F.3d 487, 495 (9th Cir. 2008); see also Gulliford v.
Pierce Co., 136 F.3d 1345, 1348 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 828 (1998)
(three requirements for "limited exception" to "strict interpretation of FRCP 51");
Voohries–Larson, 241 F.3d at 714 (three requirements); United States v. Klinger,
128 F.3d 705, 711 (9th Cir. 1997) (three requirements for "sole exception").
The panel purports to apply that common law exception here, but in
fact adopts a much broader new exception because it is undisputed that Cox does
not meet the criteria for the historic exception. (Panel Op. 7-8.) Cox concedes that
she does not meet the third criterion—offering an alternative instruction. (Cox
Reply 18.) Moreover, regarding the first and second criteria, Cox never argued, let
alone throughout trial, that Gertz applied to non-media defendants, as the district
court itself explained in denying a new trial. (1-ER-13-14.) All Cox ever said
was, "I am media." The district court never considered whether the negligence
standard might be extended to non-media defendants, and it certainly did not rule
on that issue, because no one ever raised it. (Id.) The only issue the court
considered (and ruled on) was whether Cox was "media."
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According to the panel decision, the fact that Cox made one specific
First Amendment argument before trial ("I am media"), which the trial court
rejected, was sufficient to preserve for de novo appellate review any and every
First Amendment argument she might ever make, even one that is contrary to the
one she actually made. She does not have to comply with Rule 51. She does not
have to meet the requirements of the historic common law exception, including
making the "disputed" argument "throughout the trial" and offering an "alternative
instruction." All she has to do is invoke "the First Amendment" and then wait and
see whether she loses at trial, in which case she can make a host of new arguments
to get a new trial. (Panel Op. 8.) The panel's expansive new exception to Rule 51
is inconsistent with past case law in this Circuit and puts a terrible burden on trial
courts and opposing litigants.
III.

Loya and Dorn Demonstrate Why En Banc Consideration Is Needed
The panel cites Loya v. Desert Sands Unified School District, 721

F.2d 279 (9th Cir. 1983) and Dorn v. Burlington N. Santa Fe R.R. Co., 397 F.3d
1183 (9th Cir. 2005) as authority for de novo review in this case. (Panel Op. 7-8.)
Both cases were tried under the pre-2003 version of Rule 51. In Loya, 721 F.2d at
282, the district court imposed "limitations on the manner in which objections were
to be placed on the record," and the appellant objected in the manner allowed. In
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Dorn, 397 F.3d at 1189, the district court "warned" the appellant not to "rehash"
any further an argument made throughout trial and repeatedly rejected by the court.
Citing the common law exception, both panels found the alleged error preserved.
It is unclear whether the parties in Loya and Dorn actually satisfied
the three requirements for the "sole" historic common law exception to Rule 51, or
whether the panels meant to adopt a new "second" exception for cases in which the
district court interferes with a party's ability to comply with Rule 51. If the latter,
it certainly would have no relevance here, because the district court in no way
interfered with Cox's ability to comply with Rule 51.
Regardless, the failure of panels of this Court to consistently
recognize and apply the three specific requirements for the historic common law
exception to Rule 51 is causing a disintegration of the preservation requirements
for instructional errors in this Circuit, once the "strictest enforcer" of Rule 51. The
fact that the panel purported to apply the exception here when it is undisputed that
Cox did not meet its requirements shows how far the preservation requirements
have deteriorated. The panel's broad new exception to Rule 51 should be rejected.
IV.

The Standard of Review Determines the Outcome
The difference between de novo and "plain error" review is often

outcome-determinative, including here. Cox could not obtain reversal on "plain
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error" review because the panel is announcing new law on a "question of first
impression" in this Circuit. (Panel Op. 3.) See United States v. Anekwu, 695 F.3d
967, 973 (9th Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 2379 (2013) (stating that "plain
error" is "clear or obvious, rather than subject to reasonable dispute"); United
States v. Dupas, 419 F.3d 916, 924 (9th Cir. 2005) ("For an error to be plain, it
must be 'clear' or 'obvious' under current law.").2 While the panel is free to adopt a
negligence standard for non-media defendants prospectively, there is no "plain
error" in such circumstances. E.g., Kilbride, 584 F.3d at 1255 (announcing new
First Amendment rule prospectively, but affirming on "plain error" review of jury
instructions because the law was previously unsettled).
"OPINION" SPEECH AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT
There is a second, equally important issue that warrants en banc
consideration. Under the panel decision, anyone who makes false statements on
matters of public concern—including criminal allegations (which the panel says
are "generally" matters of public concern)—will only be subject to liability in this
Circuit if they were at least negligent. The extension of the negligence standard to

2

The Supreme Court has repeatedly declined to decide whether to extend the
negligence standard to non-media defendants, and the few courts to address the
issue are split, as Cox's own amicus explains. (Plaintiffs' Response Brief 31-36;
Reporters Committee Amicus Brief 5-6.) No one could fairly claim that the law on
this issue was clear, obvious, and not subject to reasonable dispute.
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13
non-media defendants, who do not have editors or journalistic standards to worry
about, makes the Supreme Court's decision in Milkovich more important than ever.
Under Milkovich, any defamatory statement that a reasonable juror could find to
imply a verifiable fact is actionable. The panel decision, holding that Cox's
statements accusing Plaintiffs of various crimes are non-actionable "pure opinion,"
is inconsistent with Milkovich and post- Milkovich decisions of this Court.
In Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 3-5, a high school wrestling team had an
altercation with a visiting team. After investigation, the athletic association
censured the team's coach, Milkovich, and took disciplinary action against the
team. Parents and wrestlers sued the association. Milkovich testified, suggesting
under oath that he and his team were entirely innocent. The disciplinary action
was subsequently overturned. A local reporter wrote an article about the lawsuit.
Entitled "Maple beat the law with 'the big lie,'" the basic theme was that Milkovich
had lied to obtain a favorable decision.
The Supreme Court held that this type of speech is not protected by
the First Amendment. Id. at 21-22. It firmly rejected a separate constitutional
privilege for "opinion." Id. at 18. It also made clear that couching statements in
"opinion" language, such as "I think" or "in my opinion," is irrelevant. Id. "If a
speaker says, 'In my opinion John Jones is a liar,' he implies a knowledge of facts
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which lead to the conclusion that Jones told an untruth." Id. The dispositive
question is whether the speaker is seriously asserting or implying a "fact"
susceptible of being proved true or false. Id. at 21-22. If so, it is actionable. Id.
Thus, the statements in Milkovich were actionable because the reporter implied that
Milkovich had committed the crime of perjury, an "objectively verifiable event"
susceptible of being proved true or false. Id. It did not matter that the article was
an editorial (a "well-recognized home of opinion and comment"), that the speaker
had an apparent bias (the article was published in the visiting team's home
newspaper), or that the "tone" of the article was "pointed, exaggerated, and heavily
laden with emotional rhetoric and moral outrage." Id. at 31-33 (dissent). The
statements implying facts were actionable. Id. at 21-22.
Here, Cox has repeatedly asserted that Plaintiffs are "criminals"
engaged in various specific crimes, including tax fraud, corruption, deceit on the
government, money laundering, defamation, harassment, fraud against the
government, and solar tax credit fraud. (2-SER-155-187.) She says Plaintiffs have
bribed politicians and media. (2-SER-161.) She claims "many" people have told
her Padrick "is not above killing someone to shut them up." (2-SER-170.)
The panel's conclusion that these statements are protected by the First
Amendment cannot stand under Milkovich. The panel either misapplies Unelko
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15
Corp. v. Rooney, 912 F.2d 1049 (9th Cir. 1990), creating confusion in this Circuit,
or reveals through its application of Unelko that current Ninth Circuit standards for
protected speech under the First Amendment conflict with Milkovich.
Whether a defamatory statement is actionable under Milkovich turns
solely on whether the statement was made seriously and could be found by a
reasonable juror to imply a "fact" susceptible of being proved true or false.
Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 21. Here, it is readily apparent that Cox does not mean her
accusations in any loose, figurative, or hyperbolic sense. She is literally and
seriously accusing Plaintiffs of committing crimes, which is susceptible of being
proved true or false, as any government prosecutor will attest.3 The Supreme
Court did not hesitate to find the perjury accusation in Milkovich actionable. Cox's
general tenor and writing style may make more discerning readers (such as federal
judges) question her reliability as an information source, but it does not negate the
impression that she is seriously asserting and implying facts. Indeed, Cox touts
herself as an "investigative blogger" who tells the "truth" and "facts" to "expose"
corruption, give consumers "knowledge," and reveal the "truth." (E.g., 2-SER155-156; 2-SER-166-168; 2-SER-178.) She assures readers she has "only posted

3

Plaintiffs did not seek to impose liability for statements that are loose or
figurative, and unverifiable, such as calling Plaintiffs "thugs," "evil doers," and
"assholes."
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16
truth" and has "tons of proof."4 (E.g., 2-SER-187; 2-SER-161; 2-SER-168.)
These statements are actionable under Milkovich. They are also
actionable under post-Milkovich decisions in this Circuit. See Unelko, 912 F.2d at
1053 (recognizing that Milkovich "effectively overruled" earlier Ninth Circuit
decisions). In Unelko, 912 F.2d at 1049, Andy Rooney's statement that Rain-X
"didn't work," made during a "humorous and satirical" broadcast about products
people had sent him, was held actionable because it was intended as a statement of
fact, even though Rooney often made rhetorical and hyperbolic statements. In
Rodriguez v. Panayiotou, 314 F.3d 979, 987 (9th Cir. 2002), George Michael's use
of "colorful and humorous language" to describe a police officer engaging in lewd
acts while arresting him did not negate the impression that he was "seriously"
alleging lewd conduct occurred, which was susceptible to being proved true or
false. In Manufactured Home Communities, Inc. v. County of San Diego, 544 F.3d
959 (9th Cir. 2008), saying someone "lied" to county officials and implying they
had a "reputation for driving out elderly tenants" was actionable. Regardless,
Cox's statements are actionable under Milkovich, so, to the extent this Court's law

4

The panel's suggestion that no reasonable person would take Cox's posts seriously
because of her writing style, even though she means them seriously, has no basis in
law or fact. (See Pls. Response Brief 65-66.) In reality, even the most discerning
readers tend to believe there must be some truth to Cox's allegations. Where there
is smoke, there must be fire.
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conflicts with Milkovich, it must be put back in line with Milkovich.
Finally, the panel's implicit focus on their own assessment of
Defendant's credibility, rather than the serious and objectively verifiable nature of
her defamatory statements, creates a perverse incentive for bloggers and others to
make false statements in as loud and bombastic a manner as possible to attain
maximum constitutional protection. This is particularly troubling when the panel
has also said that criminal allegations are generally "matters of public concern."
(Panel Op. 13.) The resulting message is that if you are going to defame someone,
do it by accusing them of a crime, then mix in name-calling and exclamation marks
to get complete constitutional immunity.
That is not the law. Over the past five decades, the Supreme Court
has struck a very difficult and delicate balance between the First Amendment and
state defamation laws. See Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 23 ("We believe our decision in
the present case holds the balance true."). Failing to faithfully apply Milkovich
while simultaneously extending Gertz throws off that balance entirely. The
Supreme Court has recognized many times that there are two sides to the equation.
The numerous decisions [] establishing First Amendment
protection for defendants in defamation actions surely
demonstrate the Court's recognition of the Amendment's vital
guarantee of free and uninhibited discussion of public issues.
But there is also another side to the equation; we have regularly
acknowledged the important social values which underlie the
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law of defamation, and recognized that society has a pervasive
and strong interest in preventing and redressing attacks upon
reputation. * * * The destruction that defamatory falsehood can
bring is, to be sure, often beyond the capacity of the law to
redeem. Yet, imperfect though it is, an action for damages is
the only hope for vindication or redress the law gives to a man
whose reputation has been falsely dishonored.
Id. at 22-23 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
Online speech has no more constitutional protection than any other
kind of speech. In re Anonymous Online Speakers, 661 F.3d 1168, 1173 (9th Cir.
2011). False statements published online certainly are no less damaging. To the
contrary, because "the Internet provides a virtually unlimited, inexpensive, and
almost immediate means of communications with tens, if not hundreds, of millions
of people, the dangers of its misuse cannot be ignored." Cohen v. Google, Inc.,
887 N.Y.S.2d 424, 428 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2009) (ordering Google to identify
anonymous blogger who posted defamatory statements); see also, e.g., Fodor v.
Doe, No. 3:10-CV-0798, 2011 WL 1629572 *1(D. Nev.) (regarding blog posting
that implicated plaintiff in "criminal activity to defraud investors").
Here, the panel decision hits defamed citizens with a double whammy.
If publicly accused of a crime, you not only must prove at least "negligence" to
obtain relief, but you will have no relief at all if the speaker uses run-on sentences,
mixes in name-calling, and publishes the defamatory statements on a "non-
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professional" website. (Panel Op. 17.) That is not the law under Milkovich, and
this Court must conform its case law to Milkovich. Otherwise people like Cox,
who do not hesitate to broadcast to the world false statements about other people,
will do so with impunity in the Ninth Circuit.
DATED this 7th day of February, 2014.
Respectfully Submitted,
TONKON TORP LLP
By: s/ Robyn Ridler Aoyagi
Robyn Ridler Aoyagi
Steven M. Wilker
David S. Aman
Attorneys for Kevin D. Padrick and
Obsidian Finance Group, LLC
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Before: Arthur L. Alarcn, Milan D. Smith, Jr.,
and Andrew D. Hurwitz, Circuit Judges.
Opinion by Judge Hurwitz

SUMMARY

Defamation
The panel affirmed in part and reversed in part the district
court’s judgment awarding compensatory damages to a
bankruptcy trustee On a defamation claim against an Internet
blogger.
The panel held that Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S.
323, 350 (1974) (holding that the First Amendment required
only a "negligence standard for private defamation actions"),
is not limited to cases with institutional media defendants.
The panel further held that the blog post at issue addressed a
matter of public concern, and the district court should have
instructed the jury that it could not find the blogger liable for
defamation unless it found that she acted negligently. The
panel held that the bankruptcy trustee did not become a
"public official" simply by virtue of court appointment, or by
receiving compensation from the court. The panel remanded
for a new trial on the blog post at issue, and affirmed the
district court’s summary judgment on the other blog posts
that were deemed constitutionally protected opinions.

* This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has
been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.
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OPINION
HURWITZ, Circuit Judge:
This case requires us to address a question of first
impression: What First Amendment protections are afforded
a blogger sued for defamation? We hold that liability for a
defamatory blog post involving a matter of public concern
cannot be imposed without proof of fault and actual damages.
I.
Kevin Padrick is a principal of Obsidian Finance Group,
LLC (Obsidian), a firm that provides advice to financially
distressed businesses. In December 2008, Summit
Accommodators, Inc. (Summit), retained Obsidian in
connection with a contemplated bankruptcy. After Summit
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filed for reorganization, the bankruptcy court appointed
Padrick as the Chapter 11 trustee. Because Summit had
misappropriated funds from clients, Padrick’s principal task
was to marshal the firm’s assets for the benefit of those
clients.
After Padrick’s appointment, Crystal Cox published blog
posts on several websites that she created, accusing Padrick
and Obsidian of fraud, corruption, money-laundering, and
other illegal activities in connection with the Summit
bankruptcy. Cox apparently has a history of making similar
allegations and seeking payoffs in exchange for retraction.
See David Carr, When Truth Survives Free Speech, N.Y.
Times, Dec. 1], 2011, at BI. Padrick and Obsidian sent Cox
a cease-and-desist letter, but she continued posting
allegations. This defamation suit ensued.
A.
The district court held that all but one of Cox’s blog posts
were constitutionally protected opinions because they
employed figurative and hyperbolic language and could not
be proved true or false. Obsidian Fin. Grp., LLC v. Cox, 812
F. Supp. 2d 1220, 1232-34 (D. Or. 2011). The court held,
however, that a December 25, 2010 blog post on
bankruptcycorruption. corn made "fairly specific allegations
[that] a reasonable reader could understand . . . to imply a
provable fact assertion"i.e., that Padrick, in his capacity as
bankruptcy trustee, failed to pay $174,000 in taxes owed by
Summit. Id. at 1238. The district judge therefore allowed
that single defamation claim to proceed to a jury trial. The
jury found in favor of Padrick and Obsidian, awarding the
former $1 .5 million and the latter $1 million in compensatory
damages.
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B.
In a pretrial memorandum, Coxthen representing
herselfraised two First Amendment arguments concerning
the liability standards that should govern this case. First, Cox
argued that because the December 25 blog post involved a
matter of public concern, Padrick and Obsidian had the
burden of proving her negligence in order to recover for
defamation, and that they could not recover presumed
damages absent proof that she acted with New York Times
Co. v. Sullivan "actual malice"that is, that she knew the
post was false or acted with reckless disregard of its truth or
falsity. See 376 U.S. 254, 280 (1964). Cox alternatively
argued that Padrick and Obsidian were public figures, and
thus were required to prove that Cox made the statements
against them with actual malice. Id.
On the day before trial, the district court rejected both
arguments in an oral decision. In a written decision, issued
two days later, the judge explained that Padrick and Obsidian
were not required to prove either negligence or actual
damages because Cox had failed to submit "evidence
suggestive of her status as a journalist." Obsidian Fin. Grp.,
LLCv. Cox,No. 3:1 1-cv-00057-HZ,201 1 WL5999334,at*5
(D. Or. Nov. 30, 2011). The district court also ruled that
neither Padrick nor Obsidian was an all-purpose public figure
or a limited public figure based upon Padrick’s role as a
bankruptcy trustee, finding that they had not injected
themselves into a public controversy, but rather that Cox had
"created the controversy. . . ." Id. at *4
After closing arguments, the district court instructed the
jury that under Oregon law, "Defendant’s knowledge of
whether the statements at issue were true or false and
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defendant’s intent or purpose in publishing those statements
are not elements of the claim and are not relevant to the
determination of liability." The court further instructed that
the "plaintiffs are entitled to receive reasonable compensation
for harm to reputation, humiliation, or mental suffering even
if plaintiff does not present evidence that proves actual
damages . . . because the law presumes that the plaintiffs
suffered these damages." The jury verdicts in favor of
Padrick and Obsidian followed.
Coxnow represented by counselmoved for a new
trial. In its order denying that motion, the district court
acknowledged that Cox had argued that "she was entitled to
certain First Amendment protections, including requiring
plaintiffs to establish liability by proving that [she] acted with
some degree of fault, whether it be negligence or ’actual
malice.’" Obsidian Fin. Grp., LL v. Cox, No. 3:11 -cv00057-HZ, 2012 WL 1065484, at *7 (D. Or. Mar, 27, 2012).
But, the judge again rejected Cox’s arguments that Padrick
and Obsidian "were public figures, and that the blog post
referred to a matter of public concern," and thus concluded
that a showing of fault was not required to establish liability,
and that presumed damages could be awarded, Id. at *4
Cox appeals from the denial of her motion for a new trial.
Obsidian and Padrick cross-appeal, contending that their
defamation claims about the other blog posts should have
gone to the jury. We have jurisdiction over both appeals
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We reverse the denial of a
motion for a new trial if the district court has made a mistake
of law. Moiski v. MJ. Cable, Inc., 481 F.3d 724, 729 (9th
Cir. 2007). We "review de novo whether a jury instruction
misstates the law." Dream Games ofAriz., Inc. v. PC Onsite,
561 F.3d 983, 988 (9th Cir. 2009) (quotation marks and
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citation omitted). And we review a grant of summary
judgment de novo, Doe No. 1 v. Reed, 697 F.3d 1235, 1238
(9th Cir. 2012).
II.
Cox does not contest on appeal the district court’s finding
that the December 25 blog post contained an assertion of fact;
nor does she contest the jury’s conclusions that the post was
false and defamatory. She challenges only the district court’s
rulings that (a) liability could be imposed without a showing
of fault or actual damages and (b) Padrick and Obsidian were
not public officials.
A.
After the district court’s orders on the issues raised in her
pretrial memorandum, Coxthen still representing
herselfdid not propose specific jury instructions. When
asked by the district court whether she wished to do so, she
stated that she had no objection to the court’s proposed jury
instructions, which were consistent with its earlier First
Amendment rulings. Padrick and Obsidian argue that Cox
therefore waived any First Amendment objections to the jury
instructions.
We disagree. To preserve an argument about a jury
instruction for appeal, a party generally must make a specific
contemporaneous objection to the instruction "on the record,
stating distinctly the matter objected to and the grounds for
the objection." Fed. R. Civ. P. 51 (c)(1). But, "when the trial
court has rejected plaintiff’s posted objection and is aware of
the plaintiff’s position, further objection by the plaintiff is
unnecessary." Lo,ya v, Desert Sands Unified Sch. Dist., 721
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F.2d 279, 282 (9th Cir. 1983) (citing Brown v. Avemco Inv.
Corp., 603 F.2d 1367 (9th Cir. 1979)); see also Dorn v.
Burlington N. Santa Fe R.R. Co., 397 F.3d 1183, 1189 (9th
Cir. 2005) ("In light of its definitive ruling on a motion in
limine and subsequent warning about rehashing the issue, the
district court was fully informed of Burlington’s position on
the jury instructions . . .
The district court here was fully informed before trial of
Cox’s First Amendment arguments and had rejected them
definitively before the close of evidence. "[A]ny further
objection would have been superfluous and futile . . .
Dorn, 397 F.3d at 1189. Indeed, in denying Cox’s new trial
motion, the district judge specifically noted that he had
instructed the defendant to raise her legal arguments in her
trial memorandum, and that he understood those arguments
to be that "she was entitled to certain First Amendment
protections, including requiring plaintiffs to establish liability
by proving that defendant acted with some degree of fault,
whether it be negligence or ’actual malice." Obsidian Fin.
Grp., LLC v. Cox, 2012 WL 1065484, at *7 In ruling on the
new trial motion, the district court initially suggested that
Cox had waived those arguments by not objecting to the jury
instructions, but in the end again treated them on the merits
and rejected them. Under the facts of this case, Cox
preserved the issues raised in her motion for new trial for
review.
B.
The Supreme Court’s landmark opinion in New York
Times Co. v. Sullivan began the construction of a First
Amendment framework concerning the level of fault required
for defamation liability. 376 U.S. 254. Sullivan held that
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when a public official seeks damages for defamation, the
official must show "actual malice"that the defendant
published the defamatory statement "with knowledge that it
was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or
not." Id. at 280. A decade later, Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.,
held that the First Amendment required only a "negligence
standard for private defamation actions." 418 U.S. 323, 350
(1974). This case involves the intersection between Sullivan
and Gertz, an area not yet fully explored by this Circuit, in the
context of a medium of publicationthe Internetentirely
unknown at the time of those decisions.
1.
Padrick and Obsidian first argue that the Gertz negligence
requirement applies only to suits against the institutional
press. Padrick and Obsidian are correct in noting that Gertz
involved an institutional media defendant and that the Court’s
opinion specifically cited the need to shield "the press and
broadcast media from the rigors of strict liability for
defamation." 418 U.S. at 348. We conclude, however, that
the holding in Gertz sweeps more broadly.
The Gertz court did not expressly limit its holding to the
defamation of institutional media defendants. And, although
the Supreme Court has never directly held that the Gertz rule
applies beyond the institutional press, it has repeatedly
refused in non-defamation contexts to accord greater First
Amendment protection to the institutional media than to other
speakers. In Bartnicki v. Vopper, for example, in deciding
whether defendants could be held liable under a statute
banning the redistribution of illegally intercepted telephone
conversations, the Court expressly noted that "we draw no
distinction between the media respondents and" a non-

(9o, 123)
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institutional respondent. 532 U.S. 514, 525 & n.8 (2001).
Similarly, in Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., the Court held that
the press gets no special immunity from laws that apply to
others, including thosesuch as copyright lawthat target
communication. 501 U.S. 663, 669-70 (1991). And in First
National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, a case involving
campaign finance laws, the Court rejected the "suggestion
that communication by corporate members of the institutional
press is entitled to greater constitutional protection than the
same communication by" non-institutional-press businesses.
435 U. S. 765, 782 n,1 8(1978); see also Henry v. Collins, 380
U.S. 356, 357 (1965) (per curiam) (applying Sullivan
standard to a statement by an arrestcc); Garrison v.
Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 67-68 (1964) (applying Sullivan
standard to statements by an elected district attorney);
Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 286 (applying identical First
Amendment protection to a newspaper defendant and
individual defendants).
The Supreme Court recently emphasized the point in
Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission; "We have
consistently rejected the proposition that the institutional
press has any constitutional privilege beyond that of other
speakers." 558 U.S. 310, 352 (2010) (internal quotations
omitted). In construing the constitutionality of campaign
finance statutes, the Court cited with approval, id., the
position of five Justices in Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v.
Greenmoss Builders, Inc., that "in the context of defamation
law, the rights of the institutional media are no greater and no
less than those enjoyed by other individuals engaged in the
same activities." 472 U.S. 749, 784 (1985) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting); id. at 773 (White, J., concurring in the judgment)
("[T]he First Amendment gives no more protection to the
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press in defamation suits than it does to others exercising
their freedom of speech.").
Like the Supreme Court, the Ninth Circuit has not directly
addressed whether First Amendment defamation rules apply
equally to both the institutional press and individual
speakers.’ But every other circuit to consider the issue has
held that the First Amendment defamation rules in Sullivan
and its progeny apply equally to the institutional press and
individual speakers. See, e.g., Snyder v. Phelps, 580 F.3d
206, 219 n.13 (4thCir. 2009), affd, 131 S.Ct. 1207 (2011)
("Any effort to justify a media/nonmedia distinction rests on
unstable ground, given the difficulty of defining with
precision who belongs to the ’media."); Flamm v. Am. Ass ’n
of Univ. Women, 201 F3d 144,149 (2d Cir. 2000) (holding
that "a distinction drawn according to whether the defendant
is a member of the media or not is untenable"); In re IBP
Confidential Bus. Documents Litig., 797 F.2d 632, 642 (8th
Cir. 1986); Garcia v. Bd. ofEduc., 777 F.2d 1403, 1410 (10th
Cir. 1985); Avins v. White, 627 F.2d 637,649 (3d Cir. 1980);
Davis v. Schuchat, 510 F.2d 731, 734n.3 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
We agree with our sister circuits. The protections of the
First Amendment do not turn on whether the defendant was
a trained journalist, formally affiliated with traditional news
entities, engaged in conflict-of-interest disclosure, went
Dun & Bradstreet held that presumed and punitive damages are
constitutionally permitted in defamation cases without a showing of actual
malice when the defamatory statements at issue do not involve matters of
public concern. See 472 U.S. at 763.
But cf. Newcombe v. Adolf Coors Co., 157 F.3d 686, 694 n.4 (9th Cit.
1998) (citing Gertz in a defamation ease in which the lead defendant was
not a member of the institutional media).
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beyond just assembling others’ writings, or tried to get both
sides of a story. As the Supreme Court has accurately
warned, a First Amendment distinction between the
institutional press and other speakers is unworkable: "With
the advent of the Internet and the decline of print and
broadcast media. . . the line between the media and others
who wish to comment on political and social issues becomes
far more blurred." Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 352. In
defamation cases, the public-figure status of a plaintiff and
the public importance of the statement at issuenot the
identity of the speakerprovide the First Amendment
touchstones.
We therefore hold that the Gertz negligence requirement
for private defamation actions is not limited to cases with
institutional media defendants. But this does not completely
resolve the Gertz dispute. Padrick and Obsidian also argue
that they were not required to prove Cox’s negligence
because Gertz involved a matter of public concern 3 and this
case does not.
2.
The Supreme Court has "never considered whether the
Gertz balance obtains when the defamatory statements
involve no issue of public concern." Dun & Bradstreet, 472

Gertz dealt with a libel claim brought by a Chicago lawyer who had
been accused by the magazine of the John Birch Society of taking part in
a Communist campaign to discredit local law enforcement agencies. See
Dim & Bradstreet, 472 U.S. at 756.
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U.S. at 757 (plurality opinion). 4 But even assuming that
Gertz is limited to statements involving matters of public
concern, Cox’s blog post qualifies.
The December 25 post alleged that Padrick, a courtappointed trustee, committed tax fraud while administering
the assets of a company in a Chapter 11 reorganization, and
called for the "IRS and the Oregon Department of Revenue
to look" into the matter. Public allegations that someone is
involved in crime generally are speech on a matter of public
concern. See, e.g., Adventure Outdoors, Inc. v. Bloomberg,
552 F.3d 1290, 1298 (11th Cir. 2008) (noting that accusations
of "alleged violations of federal gun laws" by gun stores were
speech on "a matter of public concern"); Boule v. Hutton, 328
F.3d 84, 91 (2d Cir. 2003) (holding that allegations of "fraud
in the art market" involve "a matter of public concern"). This
court has held that even consumer complaints of non-criminal
conduct by a business can constitute matters of public
concern. See Gardner v. Martino, 563 F.3d 981,989 (9th Cir.
2009) (finding that a business owner’s refusal to give a refund
to a customer who bought an allegedly defective product was
a matter of public concern); Manufactured Home Cmtys., Inc.
v. Cnty. of San Diego, 544 F.3d 959, 965 (9th Cir. 2008)
(treating claim that a mobile home park operator charged
excessive rent as a matter of public concern).
Cox’s allegations in this case are similarly a matter of
public concern. Padrick was appointed by a United States
Bankruptcy Court as the Chapter 11 trustee of a company that
had defrauded its investors through a Ponzi scheme. That
company retained him and Obsidian to advise it shortly
Dun & Bradstreet dealt only with the Gertz rule on presumed damages,
not the Gertz negligence standard. See 472 U.S. at 754-55,
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before it filed for bankruptcy. The allegations against Padrick
and his company raised questions about whether they were
failing to protect the defrauded investors because they were
in league with their original clients.
Unlike the speech at issue in Dun & Bradstreet that the
Court found to be a matter only of private concern, Cox’s
December 25 blog post was not "solely in the individual
interest of the speaker and its specific business audience."
472 U.S. at 762 (plurality opinion). The post was published
to the public at large, not simply made "available to only five
subscribers, who, under the terms of the subscription
agreement, could not disseminate it further.. . ." Id. And,
Cox’s speech was not "like advertising" and thus "hardy and
unlikely to be deterred by incidental state regulation." Id.
Because Cox’s blog post addressed a matter of public
concern, even assuming that Gertz is limited to such speech,
the district court should have instructed the jury that it could
not find Cox liable for defamation unless it found that she
acted negligently. See Gertz, 418 U.S. at 350. The court also
should have instructed the jury that it could not award
presumed damages unless it found that Cox acted with actual
malice. Id. at 349,
C.
Cox also argues that Padrick and Obsidian are
"tantamount to public officials," because Padrick was a courtappointed bankruptcy trustee. She contends that the jury
therefore should have been instructed that, under the Sullivan
standard, it could impose liability for defamation only if she
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acted with actual malice.’
disagree.
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See 376 U.S. at 279-80. We

Although bankruptcy trustees are "an integral part of the
judicial process," Lonneker Farms, Inc. v. Kiobucher, 804
F.2d 1096, 1097 (9th Cir. 1986), neither Padrick nor Obsidian
became public officials simply by virtue of Padrick’s
appointment. Padrick was neither elected nor appointed to a
government position, and he did not exercise "substantial...
control over the conduct of governmental affairs." Rosenblatt
v, Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 85 (1966). A Chapter 11 trustee can be
appointed by the bankruptcy court for cause or when the best
interests of the estate or creditors dictate. 11 U.S.C.
§ 1104(a). But, an appointed trustee simply substitutes for,
and largely exercises the powers of, a debtor-in-possession.
11 U.S.C. § 1107(a). No one would contend that a debtor-inpossession has become a public official simply by virtue of
seeking Chapter 11 protection, and we can reach no different
conclusion as to the trustee who substitutes for the debtor in
administering a Chapter 11 estate.
We also reject Cox’s argument that Padrick and Obsidian
were "tantamount to public officials" because they received
compensation from the court for their efforts. In Gertz, the
Supreme Court held that there is "no such concept" as a "de
facto public official," 418 U.S. at 351, and that a lawyer who
had served briefly on several housing committees appointed
by the mayor of Chicago, but who had never held "any
remunerative governmental position," could not be

Cox argued in her pretrial memorandum that Padrick and Obsidian
were public figures, but contended in her motion for a new trial that
Padrick was a public official. She raises only the public official argument
on appeal.
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considered a public official. Id. Bankruptcy trustees do not
receive remuneration from the government. Their
compensation is drawn from the assets of the Chapter 11
estate they administer. See ii U.S.C. § 326(a). They are not
rendered public officials by virtue of that compensation, any
more than is an expert witness compensated by the estate.
M.
Padrick and Obsidian argue on cross-appeal that the
district court erred in granting cox summary judgment as to
her other blog posts. Among other things, those posts accuse
Padrick and Obsidian of engaging in "illegal activity,"
including "corruption," "fraud," "deceit on the government,"
"money laundering," "defamation," "harassment," "tax
crimes," and "fraud against the government." Cox also
claimed that Obsidian paid off "media" and "politicians" and
may have hired a hit man to kill her.
In Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., the Supreme Court
refused to create a blanket defamation exemption for
"anything that might be labeled ’opinion." 497 U.S. 1, 18
(1990). This court has held that "while ’pure’ opinions are
protected by the First Amendment, a statement that ’may.
imply a false assertion of fact’ is actionable." Partington v.
Bugliosi, 56 17.3d 1147, 1153 (9th Cir. 1995) (quoting
Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 19). We have developed a three-part
test to determine whether a statement contains an assertion of
objective fact. Unelko Corp. v. Rooney, 912 F.2d 1049, 1053
(9th Cir. 1990). The test considers "(1) whether the general
tenor of the entire work negates the impression that the
defendant was asserting an objective fact, (2) whether the
defendant used figurative or hyperbolic language that negates
that impression, and (3) whether the statement in question is
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susceptible of being proved true or false."
F.3dat 1153.
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Partington, 56

As to the first factor, the general tenor of Cox’s blog posts
negates the impression that she was asserting objective facts.
The statements were posted on obsidianfinancesucks.com , a
website name that leads "the reader of the statements [to be]
predisposed to view them with a certain amount of skepticism
and with an understanding that they will likely present onesided viewpoints rather than assertions of provable facts."
Obsidian Fin. Grp., 812 F. Supp. 2d at 1232. The district
judge correctly concluded that the "occasional and somewhat
run-on[,] almost ’stream of consciousness’-like sentences
read more like a journal or diary entry revealing [Cox’s]
feelings rather than assertions of fact." Id. at 1233.
As to the second factor, Cox’s consistent use of extreme
language negates the impression that the blog posts assert
objective facts. Cox regularly employed hyperbolic language
in the posts, including terms such as "immoral," "really bad,"
"thugs," and "evil doers." Id. (quoting blog posts). Cox’s
assertions that "Padrick hired a ’hit man’ to kill her" or "that
the entire bankruptcy court system is corrupt" similarly dispel
any reasonable expectation that the statements assert facts.
Id.
And, as to the third factor, the district court correctly
found that, in the context of a non-professional website
containing consistently hyperbolic language, Cox’s blog posts
are "not sufficiently factual to be proved true or false." Id. at
1234. We find no error in the court’s application of the
Unelko test and reject the cross-appeal.
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Iv.
We reverse the district court’s judgment against Cox
concerning the December 25, 2010 blog post and remand for
a new trial consistent with this opinion. We affirm the
district court’s summaryjudgment on Cox’s other blog posts.
All parties are to bear their own costs on appeal.
AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, AND
REMANDED.

